Risk, rationality and expected utility theory by Pettigrew, Richard
                          Pettigrew, R. (2016). Risk, rationality and expected utility theory. Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 45(5-6), 798-826.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1119610
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1080/00455091.2015.1119610
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Taylor & Francis at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00455091.2015.1119610. Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Risk, rationality, and expected utility theory
Richard Pettigrew∗ ,†
Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have known for a long time that there
are a number of decision problems for which the preferences over the available options
that seem rational to many people cannot be accommodated within orthodox decision
theory in the natural way. In response to this observation, a number of alternatives
to the orthodoxy have been proposed (Allais, 1953; Quiggin, 1982; Schmeidler, 1989;
Buchak, 2013). In this paper, I offer an argument against those alternatives and in favour
of the orthodoxy. This argument is very general: it is effective against any deviation
from the orthodoxy. As a result, we need some account of the preferences that seem
rational and yet which this orthodoxy cannot accommodate naturally: we need an error
theory for our intuition that they are rational, or a way of making the orthodoxy accom-
modate them. I will focus here on those preferences that seem to encode sensitivity to
risk. And I will focus on the alternative to the orthodoxy proposed by Lara Buchak’s
risk-weighted expected utility theory, which is intended to accommodate these preferences
(Buchak, 2013). I will show that, in fact, the orthodoxy can be made to accommodate
the preferences in question; and I will argue that this is in fact the correct way to ac-
commodate them. Thus, the paper has two parts: the first is a general objection to any
non-expected utility theory; the second is a specific account of how to accommodate
within the orthodoxy the preferences that Buchak’s theory permits.
1 The argument for orthodox expected utility theory
1.1 Decision problems and the framework of decision theory
Here’s a decision problem. An agent is choosing between two options: on the first,
which we will call Safe, she is guaranteed to receive £50; on the second, which we will
call Risky, a fair coin will be flipped and she will receive £100 if the coin lands heads and
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£0 if the coin lands tails. There are three components of this decision problem. First: the
states of the world, namely, the state in which the coin lands heads and the state in
which the coin lands tails. Second: the outcomes, namely, £0, £50, £100. Third: the acts
between which our agent is choosing, namely, Safe and Risky. In general, a decision
problem consists of these three components:
• S is the set of states (or possible worlds).
Thus, in our example, S = {Heads, Tails}.
Degrees of belief or credences will be assigned to a finite algebra F of subsets of the
set of states S . These are propositions represented as sets of states or possible
worlds.1
• X is the set of outcomes.
Thus, in our example, S = {£0, £50, £100}. We will take outcomes to be entire
descriptions of the world, rather than merely changes in the agent’s wealth. Thus,
£0 is really Status quo + £0; £50 is really Status quo + £50; and so on. But we will
continue to denote them just by the change in the status quo that they represent.
Utilities will be assigned to the elements of X .
• A is the set of acts.
Thus, in our example, A = {Safe, Risky}.
We represent acts as finite-valued functions from S to X . That is, they take ways
the world might be and return the outcome of the act if the world were that
way. Thus, for our purposes, we can represent an act f in the set of acts A us-
ing the following notation: f = {E1, x1; . . . ; En, xn}, where x1, . . . , xn are the val-
ues that the function f might take — that is, the possible outcomes of the acts —
and, for each i = 1, . . . , n, the proposition Ei says that f will have outcome xi.
Thus, if we represent propositions as sets of possible worlds, as we did above,
Ei = {s ∈ S : f (s) = xi}. So Ei is the set of states of the world in which
f has outcome xi. Thus, in our example above, Safe = {Heads ∨ Tails, £50} and
Risky = {Heads, £100; Tails, £0}. We assume that all such propositions Ei are in the
algebra F .
For each outcome x in X , there is an act in A — which we write x — that has
outcome x regardless of the state of the world. That is, representing the act x as
a function from states to outcomes, x(s) = x for all states s in S . We call x the
constant act on x. Let X = {x : x ∈ X} ⊆ A be the set of constant acts. They will
prove particularly important in Section 4.2 below.
1A finite set X of subsets of a set S is an algebra if (i) S is in X; (ii) if Z is in X, then its complement
S− Z is in X; (iii) if Z1, Z2 are in X, then their union Z1 ∪ Z2 is in X.
2
1.2 The business of decision theory
With this framework in place, we can state the business of decision theory. It is con-
cerned with the relationship between two sorts of attitudes, which I will call external
attitudes and internal attitudes.2 The external attitudes are typically taken to be repre-
sented by the agent’s preference ordering .  is an ordering on the set A of acts. If
f and g are acts in A, we say that f  g if the agent weakly prefers act f to act g. The
internal attitudes, on the other hand, are typically taken to be given by the agent’s cre-
dences and her utilities. As mentioned above, her credences are defined on propositions
in a σ-algebra F on the set of states S . They measure how strongly she believes those
propositions. And her utilities are defined on the outcomes in X . They measure how
strongly she desires or values those outcomes.3 If you are a constructivist about the
internal attitudes, then you will take only the external attitudes to be real: you will then
take the business of decision theory to be the representation of the external attitudes by
treating the agent as if she has internal attitudes and as if she combines those attitudes
in a particular way to give her external attitudes. If, on the other hand, you are a realist
about the internal attitudes, then you will take both sorts of attitudes to be real: you
will then say that a rational agent’s internal and external attitudes ought to relate in a
particular way; indeed, they ought to relate as if she obtains her external attitudes by
combining her internal attitudes in a particular way. We will have more to say about
the business of decision theory later (cf. Section 4.2 below).
1.3 The EU Rule of Combination
Expected utility theory posits only two types of internal attitudes: these are given by
the agent’s credences and utilities. Her credences are given by a credence function
c : F → [0, 1], which we assume to be a probability function on F . Her utilities are
given by a utility function u : X → R. As with most decision theories, expected utility
theory posits one type of external attitude, namely, the agent’s preference ordering. Ex-
pected utility theory then employs the following rule of combination, which states how
her internal and external attitudes ought to relate:
EU Rule of Combination Suppose f = {E1, x1; . . . ; En, xn} is an act inA— that
is, if Ei is true, the outcome of f is xi. Then define





2The names should be considered labels only. I do not take them to imply that one sort of attitude can
be observed directly, while the other sort is knowable only by inference.
3As we will see below, one of Buchak’s central contentions is that there is a third type of internal
attitude with which decision theory deals, namely, attitudes to risk. In my alternative to Buchak’s theory,
I will incorporate such attitudes into the utilities on the outcomes. So, while these internal attitudes to
risk will be present in my account, they will be a component of the utilities, not separate attitudes.
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Then if the agent is rational, then
f  g⇐⇒ EUc,u( f ) ≥ EUc,u(g)
That is, an agent’s preferences ought to order acts by their subjective expected utility.
A number of decision theorists wish to deny the EU Rule of Combination. Buchak is
amongst them, but there are other so-called non-expected utility theorists (Allais, 1953;
Quiggin, 1982; Schmeidler, 1989). I disagree with them about the rule of combination;
however, as we will see in the second half of this paper, I agree with them about the
rationality of the preferences that they try to capture by reformulating the rule of com-
bination. In Section 3, I try to effect a reconciliation between these two positions —
the correctness of the EU Rule of Combination, on the one hand, and the rationality of
risk-sensitive preferences on the other. In this part of the paper, I wish to argue that we
ought to combine our internal attitudes in exactly the way that expected utility theory
suggests. That is, I want to argue for the EU Rule of Combination.
How can we tell between different rules of combination? It is commonly assumed
that representation theorems help us to do this, but this is a mistake. A representation
theorem presupposes a rule of combination. Relative to a particular rule of combination,
it demonstrates that, for any agent whose preferences satisfy certain axioms, there are
internal attitudes with certain properties (unique to some extent) such that these inter-
nal attitudes determine the preferences in line with that rule of combination. As many
authors have emphasised, given a different rule of combination, there will often be dif-
ferent internal attitudes with different properties that determine the same preferences,
but this time in line with this different rule of combination (Zynda, 2000; Eriksson &
Ha´jek, 2007; Meacham & Weisberg, 2011).
While both constructivists and realists must appeal to rules of combination, my ar-
gument for the EU Rule of Combination applies primarily to the realist. I attempt to
show that, for an agent with a credence function of a certain sort and a utility function,
they are irrational if they don’t combine those two functions in a particular way and set
their preferences in line with that way of combining them. It is directed at agents whose
credence function and utility function have a psychological reality beyond their being
represented as having them. Thus, it does not apply to the constructivist, who thinks of
the credence function and utility function as merely convenient mathematical ways of
representing the preference ordering.
1.4 Estimates and the EU Rule of Combination
Finally, we come to state our argument in favour of the EU Rule of Combination. It
draws on a mathematical result due to Bruno de Finetti, which we present as Theorem
1 below.
(EU1) A rational agent will weakly prefer one option to another if, and only if, her esti-
mate of the utility of the first is at least her estimate of the utility of the second.
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(EU2) A rational agent’s estimate of a quantity will be her subjective expectation of it.
Therefore,
(EUC) A rational agent’s preference ordering  will be determined by the EU Rule of
Combination.
The first premise (EU1) is supposed to be intuitively plausible. Suppose I desire
only chocolate — obtaining as much of it as possible is my only goal. And suppose
my estimate of the quantity of chocolate in the wrapper on my left is greater than my
estimate of the quantity of chocolate in the wrapper on my right. And suppose that,
nonetheless, I weakly prefer choosing the chocolate in the wrapper on my right. Then
I would seem irrational. Likewise, if I desire only utility — surely an analytic truth if
there are any — then I would seem irrational if my estimate of the utility of an act g were
higher than my estimate of the utility another act f and yet I were to weakly prefer f to
g. This is the argument for premise (EU1).
The second premise (EU2) is based on a mathematical argument together with a
plausible claim about the goodness of estimates. Estimates, so the plausible claim goes,
are better the closer they are to the true quantity they estimate. Indeed, we might take
this to be an analytic truth. That is, we might take it to be a necessary condition on
something being an estimate of a quantity that it is valued for its proximity to the actual
value of that quantity. Thus, if I estimate that the amount of chocolate remaining in
my cupboard is 73g and my friend estimates that it is 79g and in fact it is 80g, then
her estimate is better than mine. The mathematical argument is a generalization of a
result due to de Finetti, which says, very roughly, that if an agent has estimates that are
not expectations of the quantities that they estimate, there are alternative estimates of
those quantities that are guaranteed to be closer to the true values of the quantities; so
estimates that aren’t expectations are irrational.
Let’s make all of this precise. Suppose X is a quantity. Mathematically, we might
understand this as a random variable, which is a function that takes a state of the world
s and returns X(s), which is the value that this quantity takes in this state of the world.
Thus, if C is the quantity of chocolate in my cupboard in grams, and @ is the actual
state of the world, where there is 80g of chocolate in my cupboard, then C(@) = 80.
Now, given what we said above about the goodness of estimates, we can measure the
badness or disvalue of an estimate e(X) of a quantity X given a state of the world s by the
distance between e(X) and X(s). Now, I will focus on just one measure of distance here,
for the sake of simplicity, but the result also holds of a wide range of distance measures
that mathematicians call the Bregman divergences.4 Having said that, in Section 1.5, I will
4A technical note on the definition of Bregman divergences; what follows is not essential to the rest of
the argument. Suppose C is a closed, convex subset of the real numbers. And suppose ϕ : C → R is a
continuously differentiable and strictly convex function. Then the Bregman divergence generated by ϕ is
defined as follows: dϕ(x, y) := ϕ(x)− ϕ(y)− ϕ′(y)(x− y). That is, dϕ(x, y) is the difference between the
value of ϕ at x and the value at x of the tangent to ϕ taken at y. q is the Bregman divergence generated by
ϕ(x) = x2.
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offer a reason to prefer the measure of distance I use here to all other measures. The
measure of distance between two numbers x and y that I will use here is the square of
their difference |x− y|2, which is itself a Bregman divergence. For obvious reasons, we
call this the quadratic distance measure and we write it q(x, y) := |x− y|2. Thus, relative
to this measure of distance, the badness of an estimate e(X) of a quantity X given a state
of the world s is q(e(X), X(s)) = |e(X)− X(s)|2.
Now, in the argument we wish to give for (EU2), we are interested in evaluating the
goodness or badness not only of a single estimate of a single quantity, but also of a set of
estimates of a set of quantities. So our next job is to say how we measure this. Suppose
X is a set of quantities for which our agent has estimates. One of these quantities might
be the quantity of chocolate in my cupboard, for instance; another might be the quantity
of chocolate in my hand; another still might be the distance between my house and the
nearest chocolate shop; and so on. And suppose that e is her estimate function — that
is, e takes each quantity X in X and returns our agent’s estimate e(X) of that quantity.
Then we will measure the badness of an estimate function at a state of the world by
adding together the badness of each of the individual estimates that comprise it. Thus,
the badness of e at the state of the world s is the sum of each q(e(X), X(s)) for each X in
X . Then the badness of an estimate function e defined on the quantities in X at a state
of the world s is
I(e, s) := ∑
X∈X
q(e(X), X(s)) = ∑
X∈X
|e(X)− X(s)|2
With these notions defined, we have nearly defined everything that we need for our
argument for (EU2). But there is one final observation to make. Consider our credences.
It seems natural to say that my credence in a true proposition is better, epistemically
speaking, the closer it is to the maximal credence, which is 1. And it seems natural to
say that my credence in a false proposition is better, epistemically speaking, the closer
it is to 0. That is, our credence in a proposition can be seen as an estimate of a particular
quantity, namely, the quantity that takes value 1 if the proposition is true and value 0 if
the proposition is false (Jeffrey, 1986; Joyce, 1998). Given a proposition A, call this the
indicator quantity for A: thus, A(s) = 0 if A is false at s; A(s) = 1 if A is true at s.
Now, suppose that our agent has credences in all propositions in a finite algebra F .
Let’s say that her credence function is the function that assigns to each of these proposi-
tions her credence in it. Then the observation that a credence in a proposition is, or at
least should be evaluated as if it is, an estimate of the indicator quantity for that propo-
sition suggests that the badness of a credence function c at a state of the world s should
be given by
I(c, s) := ∑
A∈F
q(c(A), A(s)) = ∑
A∈F
|c(A)− A(s)|2
That is, it is the sum of the distance between each credence, c(A), and the indicator
quantity, A, corresponding to the proposition to which the credence is assigned.
Finally, we can say that an agent with a credence function c defined on the proposi-
tions in the finite algebra F and an estimate function e defined on a finite set of quan-
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tities X should be evaluated at a state of the world s as follows: her badness is given
by
I(c, s) + I(e, s) = ∑
A∈F
q(c(A), A(s)) + ∑
X∈X
q(e(X), X(s))
That completes our account of how badly an agent is doing who has credences in propo-
sitions in F and certain estimates in quantities in X .
Next, we turn to what we might show using this account. Let’s say that our agent’s
credence function c defined on finite algebra F is probabilistic if
(i) (Range) 0 ≤ c(A) ≤ 1 for all A in F .
(ii) (Normalization) c(>) = 1, where > is the tautologous proposition; that is, it is
true at all states of the world.
(iii) (Additivity) c(A ∨ B) = c(A) + c(B) if A and B are mutually exclusive proposi-
tions; that is, A and B are not true together at any state of the world.
Now suppose that c is probabilistic. Then we say that the estimate function e defined
on X is expectational with respect to c if




So an estimate function is expectational with respect to a probabilistic credence function
if its estimate of each quantity is the weighted sum of the possible values of that quantity
where the weights are given by the credence assigned to the relevant state of the world
by the credence function. We say that a pair (c, e) is probabilistic and expectational if c
is probabilistic and e is expectational with respect to c — that is, if they jointly satisfy
(i)-(iv).
For instance, suppose there are just two states of the world, s1 and s2. And let C
be the quantity of chocolate in my cupboard in grams. Let’s suppose that, in state s1,
there is a meagre 80g of chocolate in my cupboard (so C(s1) = 80), whereas in state s2,
there is veritable bounty, namely, 1000g (so C(s2) = 1000). And suppose that, having
resisted the temptation to indulge in wishful thinking, I have credence c(s1) = 0.9 in
state s1 and c(s2) = 0.1 in state s2. Then my credences are probabilistic (since they sum
to 1), and my estimate of C is expectational with respect to my credences just in case it
is e(C) = c(s1)C(s1) + c(s2)C(s2) = (0.9× 80) + (0.1× 1000) = 172.
In order to establish (EU2), the second premise of the argument for the EU Rule of
Combination, we need to show that it is a requirement of rationality that an agent have
a probabilistic credence function and an estimate function that is expectational with
respect to it. Our argument is based on the following mathematical theorem, which is
due to de Finetti (1974, 136).
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Theorem 1 (de Finetti) Suppose c is a credence function on F and e is an estimate function
on X .
(i) If (c, e) is not probabilistic and expectational, then there is another pair (c′, e′) that is
probabilistic and expectational such that
I(c′, s) + I(e′, s) < I(c, s) + I(e, s)
for all states of the world s.
(ii) If (c, e) is probabilistic and expectational, then there is no other pair (c′, e′) such that
I(c′, s) + I(e′, s) ≤ I(c, s) + I(e, s)
for all states of the world s.
Thus, if an agent either has a credence function that is not a probability function, or if
her credence function is a probability function but her estimates of quantities are not
all given by her expectations of those quantities relative to that credence function, then
there are alternative credences and estimates that, taken together, will be less bad than
her credences and estimates taken together; that is, the alternative credences and esti-
mates will be closer to the quantities that they estimate however those quantities turn
out to be. What’s more, if her credence is a probability function, and if her estimates are
given by her expectations, then there are no alternative credences and estimates that are
guaranteed to be better than hers; indeed, there are no alternative credences and esti-
mates that are guaranteed to do at least as well as hers. I provide a proof of this result
in the Appendix.
This gives us an argument for having credences that are probabilities and estimates
that are expectations. If we fail to do this, the theorem says, there are alternative cre-
dences and estimates we might have had that are guaranteed to do better than our
credences; and there is nothing that is guaranteed to do better than those alternatives;
indeed, there is nothing else that is even guaranteed to do just as well as them. Com-
pare: I am offered two gambles on a fair coin toss. On the first, if the coin lands heads, I
receive £5; if it lands tails, I lose £6. On the second, if the coin lands heads, I receive £10;
if it lands tails, I lose £3. Now suppose I choose the first gamble. You would charge me
with irrationality. After all, the second is guaranteed to be better than the first; whether
the coin comes up heads or tails, I’ll end up with more money if I’ve taken the sec-
ond gamble. We are using a similar piece of reasoning here to argue that an agent is
irrational if she has credences that are not probabilities, or if she has credences that are
probabilities, but her estimates are not expectations with respect to them. That is, we are
appealing to the so-called Dominance Principle, which says that an option is irrational if
there is an alternative that is guaranteed to be better than it, and if there is nothing that
is guaranteed to be better than that alternative. This completes our justification of the
second premise (EU2) of our argument for the EU Rule of Combination.
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You might worry here that, in the preceding justification of (EU2), we appeal to
one principle of rational choice in order to justify another: we are appealing to the
Dominance Principle in order to establish the EU Rule of Combination. And of course
we are. But that is permissible in this context. After all, the Dominance Principle is
an uncontroversial principle of decision theory. It is agreed upon by all parties to the
current debate. Buchak and all other non-expected utility theorists disagree with me
and other expected utility theorists about how credences and utilities should combine
to give preferences. But we all agree that if one option is guaranteed to be better than
another, and there is nothing that is guaranteed to be better than the first, then the
second is irrational. So the argument strategy is legitimate.
Having given our justification for (EU2), this completes our argument for the EU
Rule of Combination. According to the first premise (EU1), our preference ordering
over acts should match our estimates of the utility of those acts: that is, I should weakly
prefer one act to another iff my estimate of the utility of the first is at least as great as
my estimate of the utility of the second. According to the second premise (EU2), our
estimate of a given quantity, whether it is the utility of an act or the mass of chocolate in
my fridge, should be our expectation of that quantity; that is, it should be the weighted
average of the possible values that that quantity might take where the weights are given
by our credences in the relevant states of the world. Putting these together, we obtain
the EU Rule of Combination.
1.5 Measuring the badness of estimates
Before we leave our argument for the EU Rule of Combination, it is worth noting two
things about the distance measure q that we used to give the badness of an estimate of a
given quantity at a given state of the world, and the function I that we used to give the
badness of a set of estimates in a set of quantities at a given world. First, as noted above,
Theorem 1 holds for a wide range of alternative measures of distance; indeed, for any of
the so-called Bregman divergences. However, second, it is also true that Theorem 1 fails
for a wide range of alternative measures; indeed, it fails for the so-called absolute value
measure a, which takes the distance between real numbers x and y to be the difference
between them, that is, a(x, y) := |x− y|. Thus, this argument will be compelling to the
extent that we can justify using the quadratic measure q, or some other Bregman diver-
gence, instead of the absolute value measure a. Arguments have been given for this
assumption in the case where we are measuring only the badness of credences (Leitgeb
& Pettigrew, 2010; D’Agostino & Sinigaglia, 2010; Pettigrew, ta). In this context, it looks
most promising to extend the argument of D’Agostino & Sinigaglia (2010). The argu-
ments of Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010) assume too much, and the argument of Pettigrew
(ta) is too closely bound to the case of credences.
Above, we assumed that we begin with a measure d of the distance between a single
estimate e(X) of a single quantity X and the true value X(s) of X at a state of the world
s; and then we measure the distance between an entire estimate function e defined on
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a set X of quantities, on the one hand, and the true values of those quantities at a state
of the world s, on the other, by summing the distances, d(e(X), X(s)), between each
e(X) and X(s) for X in X . If we adapt the argument given by D’Agostino & Sinigaglia
(2010), we do not make this assumption: instead, we justify it. That is, we assume that
the badness of an estimate function e defined on X at a state of the world s is given
by some function D(e, s), and we lay down conditions on this function such that, if D
satisfies all of the conditions, then there is a continuous and strictly increasing function
H : R→ R such that












Since we appealed to the Dominance Principle in order to justify the EU Rule of Combi-
nation, and since the Dominance Principle pays attention only to the ordering of options
at a world, rather than their cardinal utilities at that world, it does not matter whether
we use the sum of the squared differences between the values or whether we use some
strictly increasing transformation of that sum. Thus, this characterization of D is suffi-
cient for our purposes.
Here are the conditions that D’Agostino & Sinigaglia (2010) place on our measure D
of the badness of an estimate function.5
Extensionality Let us say that the estimate profile of e at s is the multiset of all
pairs (e(X), X(s)) for X in X — that is, {{(e(X), X(s)) : X ∈ X}}.6 Then, if
e has the same estimate profile at s as e′ has at s′, then D(e, s) = D(e′, s′).
That is, the badness of your estimate function is a function only of its estimate profile. It
does not depend on the particular quantities to which you assign estimates. If you and
I assign estimates to very different quantities, but our estimate profiles match, then our
estimates are exactly as bad as each other.
Accurate Extension Invariance If e is an estimate function on X and X ′ ⊆
X , then let e|X ′ be the estimate function on X ′ that agrees with e on all quan-
tities in X ′ – e|X ′ is sometimes called the restriction of e to X ′. Then, if the
estimates that e assigns to quantities not in X ′ are equal to the true values of
those quantities at s, then D(e|X ′ , s) = D(e, s).
That is, adding perfectly accurate estimates to your estimate function does not affect its
badness.
Difference Supervenience If e assigns an estimate to just one quantity X,
then D(e, s) = g(|e(X)− X(s)|) for some continuous and strictly increasing
function g : R→ R.
5See also (D’Agostino & Dardanoni, 2009), where the original mathematical result is stated and
proved.
6Recall: like a set, a multiset is unordered, so that {{1, 2}} = {{2, 1}}. Unlike a set, it allows repeti-
tions, so that {{1, 1, 2}} 6= {{1, 2, 2}}.
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That is, the badness of a single estimate is a continuous and strictly increasing function
of the difference between that estimate and the true value of the quantity.
Separability If X ′ ⊆ X and
(i) D(e|X ′ , s) = D(e′|X ′ , s) and
(ii) D(e|X−X ′ , s) < D(e′|X−X ′ , s),
then D(e, s) < D(e′, s).
That is, if two estimate functions are equally bad on some subset of the quantities to
which they assign estimates, then one is worse than the other if it is worse on the re-
maining quantities.
Taken together, these four properties entail that there are continuous and strictly
increasing functions H : R→ R and f : R→ R such that:






Indeed, these four conditions are equivalent to the existence of two such functions H
and f . Thus, what we need for our conclusion is a further property that ensures that
f (x) = x2. That is the job of the final condition onD. To state it, we need the notion of an
order-reversing swap. Suppose e is an estimate function defined on a set of quantities X
and s is a state of the world. And suppose that the estimates that e assigns to quantities
X and Y are ordered correctly at s. That is,
(i) e(X) > e(Y) and X(s) > Y(s) or
(ii) e(X) < e(Y) and X(s) < Y(s).
Then, if we define eXY to be the estimate function that is obtained from e by swapping
its estimates for X and Y — so eXY(X) = e(Y) and eXY(Y) = e(X) — then we say that
eXY is an order-reversing swap of e, since the estimates that eXY assigns to quantities X
and Y are ordered incorrectly at s. Our next condition says two things: first, it says
that an order-reversing swap always increases the badness of the estimates; second, it
says that if you compare two order-reversing swaps on the same estimate function and
if (a) the two swaps involve swapping estimates that are themselves equally far apart
and (b) the two swaps involve quantities whose true values are equally far apart, then
the badness of the swaps is equal. The motivation for this condition is the following:
The badness of a set of estimates is supposed to be determined by the extent to which
they match the truth about the quantities that they estimate. As well as matching the
quantitative facts about those quantities — such as their values — it also seems to be a
good thing to match the qualitative facts about them — such as their ordering. Clearly
e matches this qualitative fact for X and Y, whereas eXY does not. Thus, other things
being equal, eXY is worse than e. And other things are equal, since all that has changed
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in the move from e to eXY is that the quantities to which the estimates e(X) and e(Y) are
assigned have been switched. Moreover, if we consider two possible order-reversing
swaps on the same estimate function where (a) and (b) hold, then the effect of each
swap on the badness of the estimate function should be the same, since there is nothing
to tell between them.
• The Badness of Order-Reversing Swaps Suppose e is defined on X and suppose
X, Y, X′, Y′ are quantities in X . And suppose e(X), e(Y) are ordered as X(s), Y(s)
are; and e(X′), e(Y′) are ordering as X′(s), Y′(s) are. And suppose |e(X)− e(Y)| =
|e(X′)− e(Y′)| and |X(s)− Y(s)| = |X′(s)− Y′(s)|. Then D(e, s) < D(eXY, s) =
D(eX′Y′ , s).
We now have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 (D’Agostino & Dardanoni) If D satisfies Extensionality, Accurate Extension
Invariance, Difference Supervenience, Separability, and The Badness of Order-Reversing Swaps,
then there is a continuous and strictly increasing functions H : R→ R such that:






This gives us what we need.
2 Expected utility and risk-weighted expected utility
In the previous section, we gave our defence of the EU Rule of Combination. In this
section, we describe Lara Buchak’s proposed alternative. To do this, we’ll illustrate the
difference between expected utility and risk-weighted expected utility using a particu-
lar act as an example. We’ll first describe the expected utility of that act, and then we’ll
show how to define its risk-weighted expected utility. Our example is the following act:
h = {E1, x1; . . . ; E4, x4}. The agent’s probabilistic credences over the events E1, . . . , E4
and her utilities for the outcomes x1, . . . , x4 are given as follows:
x1 x2 x3 x4
u 3 5 5 6
E1 E2 E3 E4
c 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4
In Figure 1, we exploit a useful diagrammatic way of representing the expected util-
ity of h, which is used by John Quiggin (1993), Peter Wakker (2010), and Lara Buchak
(2013). Figure 1 suggests two ways in which we might reformulate EUc,u( f ). These
will be very useful in understanding how expected utility theory relates to Buchak’s
proposal.
• First, it is clear that EUc,u( f ) depends only on the utilities of the outcomes to which
the act f may give rise and the probabilities that f will produce outcomes with
those utilities. Thus, given an act f = {E1, x1; . . . ; En, xn} and a utility function u,





c(E4) c(E3) c(E2) c(E1)
Figure 1: The expected utility EUc,u(h) of h is given by the grey area. It is obtained by
summing the areas of the four vertical rectangles: working from right to left, their areas
are c(E1)u(x1), . . . , c(E4)u(x4).
– u1, . . . , uk are the utilities to which f might give rise ordered from least to
greatest — that is, u1 < . . . < uk.
For instance, in our example act h: u1 = 3, u2 = 5, u3 = 6.
– Fj is the proposition that f will give rise to uj. Thus, Fj = {s ∈ S : u(h(s)) =
uj}.
For instance, in our example act h: F1 ≡ E1, F2 ≡ E2 ∨ E3, F3 ≡ E4.
We call this the ordered utility-based description of f relative to u.
Then





Figure 2 illustrates this reformulation of expected utility for our example act h.
• The second reformulation of EUc,u( f ) builds on this first and is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. Suppose f = {F1, u1; . . . ; Fk, uk} is the ordered utility-based description of f
relative to u. Then




c(Fj ∨ . . . ∨ Fk)(uj − uj−1)
Again, the expected utility of an act is given by a weighted sum: but this time the






Figure 2: Again, the expected utility EUc,u(h) of h is given by the grey area. It is ob-
tained by summing the areas of the three vertical rectangles (the middle two vertical
rectangles from Figure 1 have been merged): working from right to left, their areas are
c(F1)u1, . . . , c(F3)u3.
possible utility immediately below it; and the weight assigned to that difference is
the probability that the act will give rise to at least that much utility.
With this in hand, we’re ready to formulate Buchak’s alternative to expected util-
ity theory. Buchak is motivated by the apparent rationality of risk-sensitive behaviour.
Notoriously, some seemingly rational risk-sensitive behaviour cannot be captured by
expected utility theory at all: for instance, Allais described seemingly rational prefer-
ences that cannot be generated by any rational credence function and utility function in
the way prescribed by expected utility theory (Allais, 1953). Moreover, there are other
seemingly rationally preferences that can be generated by a credence function and util-
ity function in line with expected utility theory, but which seem to be rational even
for agents who do not have credences and utilities that would generate them in this
way. Thus, for instance, consider the two acts described in the introduction to this ar-
ticle: Safe = {Heads ∨ Tails, £50} and Risky = {Heads, £100; Tails, £0}. Suppose that our
agent strictly prefers Safe to Risky: that is, Safe  Risky. Can expected utility theory
capture the rationality of this preference? Suppose that, since the coin is known to be
fair, rationality requires that the agent assigns credences to the two states of the world
as follows: c(Heads) = 0.5 = c(Tails). Then it is still possible to describe a utility func-
tion on the outcomes £0, £50, £100 that generates these preferences in the way expected
utility theory requires. Let u(£0) = 0 and u(£100 = £50 + £50) < u(£50) + u(£50).
That is, suppose the agent treats money as a dependent good: how much utility it gives
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Figure 3: Once again, the expected utility EUc,u(h) of h is given by the grey area. It is
obtained by summing the areas of the three horizontal rectangles. Working from bottom
to top, their areas are c(F1 ∨ F2 ∨ F3)u1 = u1, c(F2 ∨ F3)(u2 − u1), and c(F3)(u3 − u2).
depends on how much of it she has already; so, money has diminishing marginal util-
ity for this agent. Then, for an agent with this credence function and utility function,
EUc,u(Safe) > EUc,u(Risky), as required. So expected utility theory can capture the ratio-
nality of these preferences. However, as Buchak rightly observes, those preferences —
that is, Safe  Risky — seem rational not only for an agent for whom money has dimin-
ishing marginal utility; they seem rational even for an agent whose utility is linear in
money. And this is something that expected utility cannot capture. Thus, Buchak is in-
terested not only in saving the Allais preferences, but also in saving other risk-sensitive
behaviour without attributing the risk-sensitive behaviour to the shape of the utility
function (Buchak, 2013, Chapter 1).
How does Buchak hope to capture these risk-sensitive preferences? Where expected
utility theory countenances only two types of internal attitude as relevant to preferences,
Buchak countenances a third as well: this third component is supposed to capture the
agent’s attitude to risk, and it is given by a function r : [0, 1] → [0, 1], which Buchak
assumes to be strictly increasing, continuous, and taking the following values, r(0) = 0
and r(1) = 1 (Buchak, 2013, Section 2.2). Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility theory
then employs the following rule of combination, which states how an agent’s internal
and external attitudes ought to relate, where the agent has credence function c, utility
function u, and risk function r:
REU Rule of Combination (Buchak, 2013, p. 53) Suppose f = {F1, u1; . . . ; Fk, uk}
is the ordered utility-based description of act f relative to utility function u.
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Figure 4: The risk-weighted expected utility REUr2,c,u(h) of h is given by the grey area,
where r2(x) := x2.
Then let




r(c(Fj ∨ . . . ∨ Fk))(uj − uj−1)
Then if the agent is rational, then
f  g⇐⇒ REUr,c,u( f ) ≥ REUr,c,u(g)
In Figure 4, we illustrate the risk-weighted expected utility of our example act h when
the agent has the risk function r2(x) := x2. Notice that the formulation of REUr,c,u( f ) is
exactly like the formulation of EUc,u( f ) that we gave above except that each probability
weight is transformed by the agent’s risk function. Thus, if r(x) < x (for all 0 < x < 1),
then, as Figure 4 illustrates, the lowest utility to which the act can give rise — namely,
u1 — contributes just as much to REUr,c,u( f ) as it does to EUc,u( f ) — it contributes
u1 to both. But further increases in utility — such as the increase from getting at least
utility u1 to getting at least u2 — make less of a contribution since their probability —
c(F2 ∨ F3) — is acted on by the risk function, and it is this reduced value — r(c(F2 ∨ F3))
— that weights the possible increases in utility. Thus, such an agent displays risk-averse
behaviour. r2 is such a risk function.
Similarly, if r(x) > x (for all 0 < x < 1), then the lowest utility to which the act
can give rise contributes just as much to REUr,c,u( f ) as it does to EUc,u( f ), but further
increases in utility make more of a contribution since their probability is acted on by
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the risk function and it is this increased value that weights the possible increases in
utility. This is illustrated in Figure 5. Such an agent displays risk-seeking behaviour.
r0.5(x) :=
√
x is such a risk function.
It’s also easy to see that, if r1(x) := x (for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1), then REUr1,c,u( f ) = EUc,u( f ).
Thus, expected utility theory is the special case of risk-weighted expected utility theory
given by a linear risk function. In such a situation, we say that the agent is risk-neutral.
This means that Buchak’s theory permits any preferences that expected utility theory
permits. But it also permits a whole lot more. For instance, one can easily recover the
Allais preferences or the preference Safe  Risky described above by attributing to an
agent a certain sort of risk function — in both cases, a risk-averse risk function.
This, then, is Buchak’s proposal.
3 Redescribing the outcomes
Moving from expected utility theory to risk-weighted expected utility theory involves
an agent evaluating an act in the way illustrated in Figure 3 to evaluating it in the way
illustrated in Figure 4. In order to begin to see how we can redescribe the REU rule of





r(c(F3)) r(c(F2 ∨ F3))
−r(c(F3))
r(c(F1 ∨ F2 ∨ F3))
−r(c(F2 ∨ F3))
Figure 6: Again, the risk-weighted expected utility REUr2,c,u( f ) of f is given by the grey
area, where r2(x) = x2.
in the way illustrated in Figure 6.7 Thus, we can reformulate REUr,c,u( f ) as follows:




(r(c(Fj ∨ . . . ∨ Fk))− r(c(Fj+1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fk)))uj + r(c(Fk))un
And we can reformulate this as follows:





r(c(Fj ∨ . . . ∨ Fk))− r(c(Fj+1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fk))




since c(Fj ∨ . . . ∨ Fk)− c(Fj+1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fk) = c(Fj).




c(Fj∨...∨Fk)−c(Fj+1∨...∨Fk) if j = 1, . . . , k− 1
r(c(Fj))
c(Fj)
if j = k
7Note that Buchak (2013, Section 4.4) considers a redescription strategy that is very close to the one I
describe in this section. However, she notes that it is ill-defined. The strategy that I describe here does
not suffer from this problem.
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Then we have:





Reformulating Buchak’s rule of combination in this way suggests two accounts of it.
On the first, utilities attach ultimately to outcomes xi, and they are weighted not by an
agent’s credences but rather by a function of those credences that encodes the agent’s
attitude to risk (given by a risk function). On this account, we group c(Fj)sj together
to give this weighting. Thus, we assume that this weighting has a particular form: it is
obtained from a credence function c and a risk function r to give c(Fj)sj; this weighting
then attaches to uj to give (c(Fj)sj)uj. This is the account that Buchak favours.
On the second account, credences do provide the weightings for utility, as in the EU
rule of combination, but utilities attach ultimately to outcome-act pairs (xi, f ). On this
account, we group sjuj together to give this utility; this utility is then weighted by c(Fj)
to give c(Fj)(sjuj). That is, we say that an agent’s utility function is defined on a new
outcome space: it is not defined on a set of outcomes X , but on a particular subset of
X ×A, which we will call X ∗. X ∗ is the set of outcome-act pairs (xi, f ) such that xi is
a possible outcome of f : that is, X ∗ = {(x, f ) ∈ X × A : ∃s ∈ S( f (s) = x)}. Now,
just as the first account assumed that the weightings of the utilities have a certain form
— namely, they are generated by a risk function and probability function in a certain
way — so this account assumes something about the form of the new utility function
u∗ on X ∗: we assume that a certain relation holds between the utility that u∗ assigns to
outcome-act pairs in which the act is the constant act over the outcome and the utility u∗
to outcome-act pairs in which this is not the case. We assume that the following holds:
u∗(x, f ) = sju∗(x, x) (1)
If a utility function on X ∗ satisfies this property, we say that it encodes attitudes to risk
relative to risk function r. Thus, on this account an agent evaluates an act as follows:
• She begins with a risk function r and a probability function c.
• She then assigns utilities to all constant outcome-act pairs (x, x), defining u∗ on
X ∗, where X ∗ = {(x, x) : x ∈ X} ⊆ X ∗.
• Finally, she extends u∗ to cover all outcome-act pairs in X ∗ in the unique way re-
quired in order to make u∗ a utility function that encodes attitudes to risk relative
to r. That is, she obtains u∗(x, f ) by weighting u∗(x, x) in a certain way that is
determined by the agent’s probability function and her attitudes to risk.
Let’s see this in action in our example act h; we’ll consider h from the point of view of
two risk functions, r2(x) = x2 and r0.5(x) =
√
x. Recall: r2 is a risk-averse risk function;
r0.5 is risk-seeking. We begin by assigning utility to all constant outcome-act pairs (x, x):
(x1, x1) (x2, x2) (x3, x3) (x4, x4)
u∗ 3 5 5 6
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Then we do the same trick as above and amalgamate the outcome-act pairs with the
same utility: thus, again, F1 is the event in which the act gives outcome-act pair (x1, h),
F2 is the event in which it gives (x2, h) or (x3, h), and F3 the event in which it gives
(x4, h). Next, we assigns utilities to (x1, h), (x2, h), (x3, h), and (x4, h) in such a way as
to make u∗ encode attitudes to risk relative to the risk function r.
Let’s start by considering the utility of (x1, h), the lowest outcome of h. Suppose our
risk function is r2; then
u∗(x1, h) :=
r2(c(F1 ∨ F2 ∨ F3))− r2(c(F2 ∨ F3))




1− 0.7 = 1.7u
∗(x1, x1)
And now suppose our risk function is r0.5; then
u∗(x1, h) :=
r0.5(c(F1 ∨ F2 ∨ F3))− r0.5(c(F2 ∨ F3))




1− 0.7 ≈ 0.54u
∗(x1, x1)
Thus, the risk-averse agent — that is, the agent with risk function r2 — values this lowest
outcome x1 as the result of h more than she values the same outcome as the result of a
certain gift of x1, whereas the risk-seeking agent — with risk function r0.5 — values it
less. And this is true in general: if r(x) < x for all x, the utility of the lowest outcome as
a result of h will be more valuable than the same outcome as a result of the constant act
on that outcome; if r(x) < x it will be less valuable.
Next, let us consider the utility of (x4, h), the highest outcome of h. Suppose her risk







u∗(x4, x4) = 0.4u∗(x4, x4)







u∗(x4, x4) = 2.5u∗(x4, x4)
Thus, the risk-averse agent — that is, the agent with risk function r2 — values this
highest outcome x4 as the result of h less than she values the same outcome as the result
of a certain gift of x4, whereas the risk-seeking agent — with risk function r0.5 — values
it more. And, again, this is true in general: if r(x) < x for all x, the utility of the highest
outcome as a result of h will be less valuable than the same outcome as a result of the
constant act on that outcome; if r(x) < x it will be more valuable.
This seems right. The risk-averse agent wants the highest utility, but also cares about
how sure she was to obtain it. Thus, if she obtains x1 from h, she knows she was guaran-
teed to obtain at least this much utility from h or from x1 (since x1 is the lowest possible
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outcome of each act). But she also knows that h gave her some chance of getting more
utility. So she values (x1, h) more than (x1, x1). But if she obtains x4 from h, she knows
she was pretty lucky to get this much utility, while she knows that she would have been
guaranteed that much if she had obtained x4 from x4. So she values (x4, h) less than
(x4, x4). And similarly, but in reverse, for the risk-seeking agent.
Finally, let’s consider the utilities of (x2, h) and (x3, h), the middle outcomes of h.
They will have the same value, so we need only consider the utility of (x2, h). Suppose
her risk function is r2; then
u∗(x2, h) :=
r2(c(F2 ∨ F3))− r2(c(F3))





∗(x2, x2) = 1.1u∗(x2, x2)
Thus, again, the agent with risk function r2 assigns higher utility to obtaining x2 as a
result of h than to obtaining x2 as the result of x2. But this is not generally true of risk-
averse agents. Consider, for instance, a more risk-averse agent, who has a risk function
r3(x) := x3. Then
u∗(x2, h) :=
r3(c(F2 ∨ F3))− r3(c(F3))





∗(x2, x2) = 0.93u∗(x2, x2)
Again, this seems right. As we said above, the risk-averse agent wants the highest
utility, but she also cares about how sure she was to obtain it. The less risk-averse agent
— whose risk function is r2 — is sufficiently sure that h would obtain for her at least the
utility of x2 and possibly more that she assigns higher value to getting x2 as a result of h
than to getting it as a result of x2. For the more risk-averse agent — whose risk function
is r3 — she is not sufficiently sure. And reversed versions of these points can be made
for risk-seeking agents with risk functions r0.5 and r0.333, for instance. Thus, we can see
why it makes sense to demand of an agent that her utility function u∗ on X ∗ encodes
attitudes to risk relative to a risk function in the sense that was made precise above —
see Equation 1.
Since what we have just provided is a genuine redescription of Buchak’s REU Rule
of Combination, we can see that Buchak’s representation theorem is agnostic between a
version of REU in which utilities attach to elements of X , and a version of EU in which
utilities attach to elements of X ∗.
Theorem 3 (Buchak) If  satisfies the Buchak axioms, there is a unique probability function
c, unique risk function, and unique-up-to-affine-transformation utility function u on X such
that  is determined by r, c, and u in line with the REU rule of combination.
And we have the following straightforward corollary:
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Theorem 4 If  satisfies the Buchak axioms, there is a unique probability function c and
unique-up-to-affine∗-transformation utility function u∗ on X ∗ that encodes attitudes to risk
relative to a risk function such that  is determined by c and u∗ in line with the EU rule of
combination (where u∗ is unique-up-to-affine∗-transformation if u∗|X ∗ is unique-up-to-affine-
transformation).
Thus, by redescribing the set of outcomes to which our agent assigns utilities, we can
see how her preferences in fact line up with her estimates of the utility of her acts, as
required by the de Finetti-inspired argument for the EU Rule of Combination given in
the previous section.
4 What’s wrong with redescription?
Although Buchak does not address precisely this particular version of the redescription
strategy, she does consider others nearby. Against those, she raises what amount to two
objections (Buchak, 2013, Chapter 4). (Buchak raises a further objection against versions
of the redescription strategy that attempt to identify certain outcome-act pairs to give a
more coarse-grained outcome space; but these do not affect my proposal.)
4.1 The problem of proliferation
One potential problem that arises when one moves from assigning utilities to X to as-
signing them to X ∗ is that an element in the new outcome space is never the outcome
of more than one act: (x, f ) is a possible outcome of act f but not of any act g other than
f . Thus, this outcome never appears in the expected utility (or indeed risk-weighted
expected utility) calculation of more than one act. The result is that very few constraints
are placed on the utilities that must be assigned to these new outcomes and the proba-
bilities that must be assigned to the propositions in order to recover a given preference
ordering on the acts via the EU (or REU) rule of combination. Suppose is a preference
ordering on A. Then, for each act f in A, pick a real number r f such that f  g iff
r f ≥ rg. Now there are many ways to do this, and they are not all affine transforma-
tions of one another — indeed, any strictly increasing τ : R → R will take one such
assignment to another. Now pick any probability function c on F . Now, given an act
f = {E1, x1; . . . ; En, xn}, the only constraint on the values u∗(x1, f ), . . ., u∗(xn, f ) is that
∑i c(Ei)u∗(xi, f ) = r f . And this of course permits many different values.8 Buchak dubs
this phenomenon belief and desire proliferation (Buchak, 2013, p. 140).
Why is this a problem? There are a number of reasons to worry about belief and
desire proliferation. There is the epistemological worry that, if utilities and probabilities
are as loosely constrained as this, it is not possible to use an agent’s observed behaviour
to predict her unobserved behaviour. Divining her preferences between two acts will
8In general, for α1, . . . , αn, r ∈ R, there are many sequences 0 ≤ λ1, . . . ,λn with ∑i λi = 1 such that
∑i λiαi = r, if there are any.
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teach us nothing about the utilities she assigns to the outcomes of any other acts since
those outcomes are unique to those acts. Also, those who wish to use representation
theorems for the purpose of radical interpretation will be concerned by the complete
failure of the uniqueness of the rationalisation of preferences that such a decision theory
provides.
Neither of these objections seems fatal to me. But in any case, the version of the
redescription strategy presented here avoids them altogether. The reason is that I placed
constraints on the sort of utility function u∗ an agent can have overX ∗: I demanded that
u∗ encode attitudes to risk; that is, u∗(x, f ) is defined in terms of u∗(x, x) in a particular
way (given by Equation 1). And we saw in Theorem 4 above that, for any agent whose
preferences satisfy the Buchak axioms, there is a unique probability function c and a
unique utility function u∗ on X ∗ that encodes attitudes to risk relative to a unique risk
function such that together c and u∗ generate the agent’s preferences in accordance with
the EU Rule of Combination.
4.2 Ultimate ends and the locus of utility
Buchak’s second objection initially seems more worrying (Buchak, 2013, pp. 137-8). A
theme running through Risk and Rationality is that decision theory is the formalisation
of instrumental or means-end reasoning. One consequence of this is that an account of
decision theory that analyses an agent as engaged in something other than means-end
reasoning is thereby excluded.
Buchak objects to the redescription strategy on these grounds. According to Buchak,
to understand an agent as engaged in means-end reasoning, one must carefully distin-
guish the means and the ends: in Buchak’s framework, the means are the acts and the
ends are the outcomes. One must then assign utilities to the ends only. Of course, in
terms of these utilities and the agent’s probabilities and possibly other representations
of internal attitude such as the risk function, one can then assign value or utility to the
means. But the important point is that this value or utility that attaches to the means is
assigned on the basis of the assignment of utility to the ultimate ends. Thus, while there
is a sense in which we assign a value or utility to means — i.e. acts — in expected utility
theory, this assignment must depend ultimately on the utility we attach to ends — i.e.
outcomes.
Thus, a first pass at Buchak’s second complaint against the redescription strategy
is this: the redescription strategy assigns utilities to something other than ends — it
assigns utilities to outcome-act pairs, and these are fusions of means and ends. Thus,
an agent analysed in accordance with the redescription strategy is not understood as
engaged in means-end reasoning.
However, this seems problematic in two ways. Whether they constitute ultimate
ends or not, there are at least two reasons why an agent must assign utilities to outcome-
act pairs rather than outcomes on their own. That is, there are two reasons why at least
this part of the redescription strategy — namely, the move from X to X ∗ — is necessary
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irrespective of the need to accommodate risk in expected utility theory.
Firstly, utilities must attach to the true outcomes of an act. But these true outcomes
aren’t the sort of thing we’ve been calling an outcome here. When I choose Safe over
Risky and receive £50, the outcome of that act is not merely £50; it is £50 as the result of
Safe. Thus, the true outcomes of an act are in fact the elements of X ∗ — they are what
we have been calling the outcome-act pairs.
Of course, at this point, Buchak might accept that utilities attach to outcome-act
pairs, but insist that it is nonetheless a requirement of rationality that an agent assign the
same utility to two outcome-act pairs with the same act component; that is, u∗(x, f ) =
u∗(x, g); that is, while utilities attach to fusions of means and ends, they must be a
function only of the ends. But the second reason for attaching utilities to outcome-act
pairs tells against this claim in general. The reason is this: As Bernard Williams urges,
it is neither irrational nor even immoral to assign higher utility to a person’s death as a
result of something other than my agency than to that same person’s death as a result
of my agency (Williams & Smart, 1973). This, one might hold, is what explains my
hesitation in a Williams-style example in which I must choose whether or not to shoot a
particular individual when I know that, if I don’t shoot him, someone else will. I assign
higher utility to the death of that person at the hands of someone else than to the death
of that person at my hands. Thus, it is permissible in at least some situations to care
about the act that gives rise to the outcome and let one’s utility in an outcome-act pair
be a function also of that act.
Nonetheless, this is not definitive. After all, Buchak could reply that this is peculiar
to acts that have morally relevant consequences. Acts such as those in the Allais paradox
do not have morally relevant consequences; but the redescription strategy still requires
us to make utilities depend on acts as well as outcomes in those cases. Thus, for non-
moral acts f and g, Buchak might say, it is a requirement of rationality that u∗(x, f ) =
u∗(x, g), even if it is not such a requirement for moral cases. And this would be enough
to scupper the redescription strategy.
However, it is not clear why the moral and non-moral cases should differ in this
way. Consider again the Williams-style example from above: I must choose whether
to shoot an individual or not; I know that, if I do not shoot him, someone else will. I
strictly prefer not shooting him to shooting him. My reasoning might be reconstructed
as follows: I begin by assigning a certain utility to this person’s death as the result of
something other than my agency — natural causes, for instance, or murder by a third
party. Then, to give my utility for his death at my hand, I weight this original utility in
a certain way, reducing it on the basis of the action that gave rise to the death. Thus, the
badness of the outcome-act pair (X’s death, My agency) is calculated by starting with the
utility of another outcome-act pair with the same outcome component — namely, (X’s
death, Not my agency) — and then weighting that utility based on the act component. We
might call (X’s death, Not my agency) the reference pair attached to the outcome X’s death.
The idea is that the utility we assign to the reference pair attached to an outcome comes
closest to what we might think of as the utility that attaches solely to the outcome; the
reference pair attached to an outcome x is the outcome-act pair (x, f ) for which the act
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f contributes least to the utility of the pair.
Now this is exactly analogous to what the redescription strategy proposes as an anal-
ysis of risk-sensitive behaviour. In that case, when you wish to calculate the utility of an
outcome-act pair (x, f ), you begin with the utility you attach to (x, x). Then you weight
that utility in a certain way that depends on the riskiness of the act. This gives the util-
ity of (x, f ). Thus, if we take (x, x) to be the reference pair attached to the outcome x,
then this is analogous to the moral case above. In both cases, we can recover something
close to the notion of utility for ultimate ends or pure outcomes (i.e. elements of X ): the
utility of the pure outcome x — to the extent that such a utility can be meaningfully said
to exist — is u∗(x, x), the utility of the reference pair attached to x. That seems right.
Strictly speaking, there is little sense to asking an agent for the utility they assign to a
particular person’s death; one must specify whether or not the death is the result of that
agent’s agency. But we often do give a utility to that sort of outcome; and when we do, I
submit, we give the utility of the reference pair. Similarly, we often speak as if we assign
a utility to receiving £50, even though the request makes little sense without specifying
the act that gives rise to that pure outcome: again, when we do so, what we really do is
give the utility of £50 for sure, that is, the utility of (£50, £50).
Understood in this way, the analysis of a decision given by the redescription strategy
still portrays the agent as engaged in means-end reasoning. Of course, there are no pure
ultimate ends to which we assign utilities. But there is something that plays that role,
namely, reference pairs. An agent’s utility for an outcome-act pair (x, f ) is calculated
in terms of her utility for the relevant reference pair, namely, (x, x); and the agent’s
value for an act f is calculated in terms of her utilities for each outcome-act pair (x, f )
where x is a possible outcome of f . Thus, though the value of an act on this account
is not ultimately grounded in the utilities of pure, ultimate outcomes of that act, it is
grounded in the closest thing that makes sense, namely, the utilities of the reference
pairs attached to the pure, ultimate outcomes of the act.
5 Conclusion
Buchak proposes a novel decision theory. It is formulated in terms of an agent’s prob-
ability function on F , utility function on X , and risk function. It permits a great many
more preference orderings than orthodox expected utility theory. On Buchak’s theory,
the utility that is assigned to an act is not the expectation of the utility of its outcome;
rather it is the risk-weighted expectation. But the argument of Section 1 of this paper
suggests that the value of an act for an agent should her estimate of the utility of its
outcome; and her estimate of a quantity should be her expectation of that quantity. And
these, together, give the EU Rule of Combination. In this paper, we have tried to recon-
cile the preferences that Buchak endorses with the EU Rule of Combination. To do this,
we redescribed the outcome space so that utilities were attached ultimately to outcome-
act pairs rather than to outcomes themselves. This allowed us to capture precisely the
preferences that Buchak permits, whilst letting the utility of an act be the expectation
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of the utility it will produce. The redescription strategy raises some questions: Does it
prevent us from using decision theory for certain epistemological purposes? Does it fail
to portray agents as engaged in means-end reasoning? In Section 4, we tried to answer
these questions.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1. We begin by giving a geometric characterization
of the pairs (c, e), where c is a credence function and e is an estimate function, such that
c is probabilistic and e is expectational relative to c.
Lemma 5 Suppose c is a credence function defined on F and e is an estimate function defined
on X . Then the following two propositions are equivalent:
(i) c is probabilistic and e is expectational with respect to c.
(ii) For each state s, there is 0 ≤ λs ≤ 1 such that ∑s∈S λs = 1 and
(a) c(A) = ∑s∈S λs A(s), for each proposition A in F ;
(b) e(X) = ∑s∈S λsX(s), for each quantity X in X .
Proof.
First, we prove (ii)⇒ (i). Suppose (ii). First, we show that c is probabilistic. Recall
that there are three conditions on being probabilistic: Range, Normalization, Additivity.
We take them each in turn.
• Range: Suppose A is in F . Then, note that: (1) each λs lies between 0 and 1
inclusive; (2) all of the λss summed together give 1; (3) A(s) = 0 or 1 for each s in
S . Thus, it is certainly true that ∑s∈S λs A(s) lies between 0 and 1 inclusive.
• Normalization: Since > is true at all states of the world, >(s) = 1 for all s in S , so
c(>) = ∑s∈S λs>(s) = ∑s∈S λs = 1.
• Additivity: If there are no states s at which both A and B are true, then c(A ∨
B) = ∑s∈S λs(A ∨ B)(s) = ∑s∈A∨B λs = ∑s∈A λs + ∑s∈B λs = ∑s∈S λs A(s) +
∑s∈S λsB(s) = c(A) + c(B).
Next, we show that e is expectational with respect to c. Suppose s′ is a state of the
world. Then note that c(s) = ∑s∈S λss′(s). But of course, since the states of the world
form a partition, s′(s) = 0 if s′ 6= s and s′(s) = 1 if s = s′. Thus, c(s) = λs. Thus,
e(X) = ∑s∈S λsX(s) = ∑s∈S c(s)X(s), as required. This gives Expectation.
Second, we prove (i)⇒ (ii). Let λs = c(s) and the result follows easily from Addi-
tivity and Expectation. 2
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The upshot of this result is the following: Suppose F = {A1, . . . , Am} and X =
{X1, . . . , Xn}. And, if c is a credence function on F and e is an estimate function on X ,
represent the pair (c, e) by the following vector in Rm+n:
~c~e := (c(A1), . . . , c(Am), e(X1), . . . , e(Xn))
And represent a state of the world s by the following vector in Rm+n:
~s := (A1(s), . . . , Am(s), X1(s), . . . , Xn(s))
Then Lemma 5 says that (c, e) is probabilistic and expectational iff~c~e lies in the convex
hull of the vectors~s for s in S — that is,~c~e ∈ {~s : s ∈ S}+.9
The second lemma that we require to prove Theorem 1 is a geometric fact about the
following measure of distance between two vectors in a real-valued vector space. If







I(c, s) + I(e, s) = Q(~c~e,~s)
for any credence function c, estimate function e, and state of the world s.
Lemma 6 Suppose D ⊆ Rk. Then
(i) If x 6∈ D+, then there is y ∈ D+ such that Q(d, y) < Q(d, x), for all d ∈ D.
(ii) If x ∈ D+, then there is no x 6= y ∈ Rk such that Q(d, y) ≤ Q(d, x), for all d ∈ D.
I won’t provide a full proof of these geometric facts — proofs can be found in any ge-
ometry textbook. But here is a brief sketch. (i) is an easy consequence of the Hilbert
Projection Theorem, since Q is the square of the Euclidean metric. (ii) is a consequence
of the fact that, if we measure distance between vectors using the Euclidean metric or
its square, Q, then, for any two vectors, the set of vectors that are closer to the first than
to the second is a convex set.
Putting these two results together and, in Lemma 6, letting D = {~s : s ∈ S}, Theo-
rem 1 follows. 2
9If C is a finite set of vectors in a vector space V over the real numbers, the convex hull of C is written C+
and defined as follows: C+ is the smallest convex set that includes C, where a set is convex if it contains
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